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Mark Potter and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal 
Politics and Public Finance in France: The Estates 
ofBurgundy, 16~1790 During the American Revolu-
tion, the French Crown increased its debt by more than a billion 
livres by soliciting lenders directly and by relying on intermedi-
ating institutions to coax savings from French people and foreign-
ers alike. Prominent among these institutions were provincial 
Estates. Estates negotiated provincial tax levels and managed the 
collection and transfer of revenues to the Crown. Few provinces 
had Estates; the Crown taxed most provinces directly. By 1661, 
the largest and wealthiest provinces that retained the privilege of 
holding Estates were Languedoc, Provence, Brittany, and Bur-
gundy. As everyone knew, Estates bonds were safer than any other 
government debt. Indeed, French people were willing to lend to 
the Estates at 5 percent for indefinite durations when they required 
8 percent or more for direct loans to the king of short duration. 
The different channels providing credit to the Crown are sig-
nificant in economic terms but even more so in political terms. 
After all, the French Revolution was ushered in by a royal 
financial crisis brought on by the magnitude of interest charges 
and by the inability of the Crown to renegotiate its m edium-term 
debt. Had the Crown been able to borrow directly under the 
same terms as it did through the Estates, it might well have 
avoided the financial dilemma that precipitated the Revolution of 
1789.1 
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The question of why Estates' bonds were safer than other 
types of government debt and why they had been so since the 
l 66os goes to the heart of the debate about the nature of abso-
lutism and privilege. It was long traditional to view the French 
monarchy between 1660 and 1789 as an increasingly powerful 
interest seeking to control all aspects of French political life and 
to marshal domestic resources for the pursuit of war. In the last 
twenty years, however, historians have begun to highlight the 
constraints that privilege placed on domestic policies and the need 
for the Crown to coopt local elites. At the heart of this new 
literature lie the issues of government revenue and, particularly, 
royal credit. Some historians emphasize the "forced" nature of 
royal credit, which they believe was a tax imposed upon govern-
ment officials. Others have argued that royal credit actually 
brought benefits to the French elite, who had the political ability 
to limit royal exactions. Yet, current research has had little success 
in revealing precisely who benefited from cooptation and who 
bore the burdens of absolutism. New answers can come from the 
rich archives of the Estates of Burgundy, which provide unusually 
detailed and complete information about credit relationships both 
with the Crown-for whom the Estates borrowed-and with the 
individuals who lent money to the Estates. Thanks to these re-
cords, we can begin to uncover the limits of absolutism and trace 
their evolution during the final 130 years of the Old Regime. 2 
To investigate the relationship between the Crown, the Es-
tates, and creditors, we have collected an extensive data set for 
the Estates' bondholders, including information about 16,169 
credit agreements contracted between 1660 and 1790, drawn from 
the register books of the Estates of Burgundy. For all of these 
l 6, l 69 loans, we transcribed their values, their dates of contract, 
and their dates of repayment, along with the names of the lenders, 
their social identities, or their occupations and residences. For 
wives and widows we included the social identities of the hus-
bands. We also gathered information on resales of loans when 
available. For the period from 1660 to 1762, we collected infor-
mation on all the loans available from the registers; for the period 
Velde and David Weir, "The Financial Market and Government Debt Policy in France, 
1746-1793," ibid., Lil (1992), 1-40. 
2 James B. Collins, Fiscal Limits of Absolutism (Berkeley, 1988), 98-107. 
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after 1762, we collected an extensive sample. Table r presents a 
summary breakdown of our data. Since occupations and resi-
dences were described in great detail in the registers, our analysis 
required aggregation, which is described in an appendix. 
Along with the database on credit contracts, we also read 
through the deliberations of the Estates concerning debt and kept 
track of loan issues. The deliberations allowed us to account for 
the purposes of the loans, the taxes on which they were funded, 
their interest rates at issue, and their aggregate values. This second 
set of data contained information on all the loan issues that we 
could find, whether or not these issues were included in the 
bondholder database. Previous histories of the social characteristics 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
SAMPLE VALUES 
VALUE OF AVERAGE 
DECADE ALL LOANS VALUE AVERAGE DURATION 
STARTING ISSUED BY THE OF NUMBER SIZE IN IN 
IN ESTATESa LOANS ab OF LOANS LIVRES YEARS 
1660 1.38 0.97 I06 9,I45 6.I6 
I670 2.31 2.2I 277 7,970 6.05 
I68o 3.56 3.56 489 7,30I 5.I 5 
1690 6.45 6.66 1,204 5,538 5.08 
1700 I 1.94 I2.0I 2,486 4,83 I 8.35 
I7IO 15.12 I5.I4 I,995 7,593 I0.25 
1720 8.7I 6.95 695 I0,000 I I.I2 
1730 8.31 4.74 587 8,075 4.94 
I740 I7-73 I8.83 I,797 8,960 I I.20 
I750 I3-72 I2.I8 2,I02 7,926 9.29 
I760 I7.80 I4.78 I,539 8,020 8.24 
I770 28.48 5.75 6I7 9,333 6.36 
I780 27.40 13.47 I,592 8,465 2.77 
a Millions of livres. 
b This sample includes both initial and secondary contracts. Thus, for the period prior to 1760 
in which our collection efforts have been exhaustive, we actually have more contracts than 
were initially issued, even though some of the initial issues do not appear in the registers. 
We reserve the detailed analysis of secondary contracts for a later communication. 
SOURCE The sample is a complete enumeration from registers C 4573, 4576, 4577, 4578, 
4579, 4580, 4581, 4582, 4583, 4584, 4585, 4586, 4587, 4588, 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 
4618, 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4649, 4727, Archives Departmentales de la Cote d'Or. For the 
period prior to l 762, the sample contains information about all the loans available. After 
1762, the contracts in the sample represent c. one-third of the loans contracted by the Estates 
of Burgundy. 
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of Old Regime bondholders have focused almost exclusively on 
the economic issue of market participation. In this article, we seek 
to go beyond such concerns in order to connect economic issues 
with political change.3 
We begin with a discussion of the politics of privilege in 
France. We then turn to the institutional particularities of the 
Estates of Burgundy and their negotiations with the Crown con-
cerning financial matters. The institutional backdrop allows us to 
link the social composition of the Estates' creditors with the nature 
of the political relationship between the Crown and the Estates. 
We then analyze how change in the social composition oflenders 
reflected the political and economic evolution of Old Regime 
France. 
THE POLITICS OF PRIVILEGE The evolution of public finance in 
absolutist France has taken center stage lately among the works 
of economic, political, and institutional historians. Scholars have 
shown interest in public finance either as a problem in itself or as 
a means of illustrating collateral developments in political, insti-
tutional, or sociological spheres. Hence, it is not uncommon for 
recent studies to treat the issues of public finance in conjunction 
with the changing political contexts of seventeenth- and eight-
eenth-century France. However, the connections between politi-
cal developments and the changes in financial structures thereby 
become blurred at times. Some of the literature on public finance, 
for example, tells a story that begins with an arbitrary Crown using 
coercive means to raise funds. Royal coercion then gradually 
disappeared in the eighteenth century, as credit markets developed 
and the Crown began to respect its financial commitments. Thus, 
students of the reign of Louis XIV tend to emphasize coercive 
attempts to raise finances, along with a high risk of default to 
investors. In contrast, those who study France after 1740 argue 
that because the Crown depended on a voluntary market for 
capital, it had to provide creditors with a relatively low risk of 
default. Missing in this story is an explanation of how the first 
model gave way to the second-· how the Crown lessened its 
3 Claude Michaud, "Notariat et sociologie de la rente a Paris au XVIIe siecle: L'Emprunt 
du clerge de 1690," Annales, XXXII (1977), n54-1187; Herbert Luthy, La banque protestante 
en France de la revocation de /'edit de Nantes a la Revolution (Paris, 1962); Adeline Daumard, Les 
fortunes fran(aises au XIX siecle (Paris, 1973). 
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reliance upon coercive, arbitrary means and instead conformed to 
the demands of an open credit market.4 
It is our contention that the evolution of public finance from 
one extreme to the other was not as linear as much of the literature 
suggests; there was no simple transition from coercion in the 
seventeenth century to open markets in the eighteenth. Through-
out both centuries, a variety of different political arrangements 
existed simultaneously between the Crown and its lenders, with 
or without various intermediaries and with varying degrees of 
both coercion and market incentives. Evolution in public finance, 
therefore, can better be understood by examining the specific 
arrangements between the Crown, intermediaries, and lenders-
arrangements that were often regionally or locally centered. 
In their search for funds, French monarchs often exploited 
privilege to construct financial arrangements with regional and 
local bodies. Bien was one of the first to suggest systematically 
how the Crown employed privilege in its search for convenient, 
low-cost borrowing. Although his study focused specifically on 
venal officer corps, he noted that other corporate bodies-such 
as provincial Estates, municipalities, and the assembly of the 
clergy-entered into similar financial relations with the Crown. 
Recognizing privilege as a peculiar form of property, in that its 
extension and preservation remained the juridical prerogative of 
the king, Bien saw it as a tool that could be wielded against its 
holders, especially in the case of venal office holders, whose 
4 The breadth of recent scholarship about Old Regime government finances is impressive. 
Some scholars have focused on fiscal questions, particularly on the size of the royal budget. 
See Michel Morineau, "Budgets de l'Etat et gestion des finances royales en France au 
dix-huitieme siecle," Revue Historique, 536 (1980), 28g-336; Alain Guery, "Les Finances de 
la Monarchie Fran1=aise sous l'Ancien Regime," Annales, XXX (1978), 216-239. Other 
studies--5uch as John F. Bosher, French Finances, 1770-1795: From Business to Bureaucracy 
(Cambridge 1970), and Daniel Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et socihe au Grand Siecle (Paris, 1984)-
have examined the financial and political relationships between the Crown and the "person-
nel" administering royal finances. Finally, some have treated both fiscal questions and the 
political roles of financiers within the context of the development of absolutism. See Collins, 
Fiscal Limits; Richard Bonney, Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624-1661 
(New York, 1978). 
It is unclear how such a model as that proposed by Douglass North and Barry Weingast, 
which emphasizes a lack of credible commitment and a strong element of coercion on the 
part of the French Crown, gives way to allow the emergence of the financial system, near 
the end of the Old Regime, based upon voluntary markets, that Velde and Weir demonstrate 
(North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of the Institutions Gov-
erning Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History, XLIX 
[1989], 803-832; Velde and Weir, "Financial Market''). 
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financial and administrative prerogatives could be undermined 
simply by creating and selling new and redundant offices. Most 
royal offices in the judicial, financial, and administrative branches 
were privately possessed by their holders. Individuals bought their 
offices either from the king or from previous holders on the 
secondary market. The king found in offices an expedient for 
raising extraordinary funds. Yet, rather than raising "loans" by 
creating new offices and risking market saturation, the Crown was 
able simply to publicize its intention to do so, inducing the 
existing officer corps to "offer" the Crown a don gratuit so as to 
preserve, for the time being, their jurisdiction and, thus, the value 
of their members' investments. Essentially, the present owners 
were adding capital to their offices-capital to which the Crown 
would then gain access. 5 
But the capital did not necessarily come from the pockets of 
the owners themselves. With the legal power to draw up contracts 
and act for the collectivity of its membership, the officer corps 
could borrow from the public. Moreover, investors could take 
legal recourse against the corps-and against the property of its 
members-if ever needed. As a result, the officer corps repre-
sented "good" risks to lenders, and they were able to borrow at 
rates between 4 and 5 percent-at half the cost that the Crown 
would have had to pay by borrowing directly from the public. 
To compensate the corps, the Crown raised its annual gages 
(salaries) accordingly, and the corps, in tum, used these augmenta-
tions de gages to service its debts. In Bien's words, "the corps 
established a public debt in its own name, though, in fact, it passed 
on the capital to the king. "6 
5 David Bien, "Offices, Corps, and a System of State Credit: The Uses of Privilege under 
the Ancien Regime," in Keith Baker (ed.), The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern 
Political Culture (Oxford, 1987), 96-97. Gail Bossenga offers an in-depth analysis of Bien's 
theory in practice in her study of the local privileged corporations in Lille. Hilton Root has 
also focused on the political implications of royal finance, namely, the resulting alliance 
between the Crown and Burgundian village communities that was impelled by the Crown's 
financial needs (Bossenga, The Politics of Privilege: Old Regime and Revolution in Lille [New 
York, 1991]; Root, Peasants and King in Burgundy: The Agrarian Foundations of French Absolutism 
[Berkeley, 1987)). 
6 Bien, "Offices," ro6-ro7. Gages-interest payments made by the Crown to venal 
officers-represented but a fraction of the income from many offices. Judicial officers, for 
example, received payments from those requiring their services. Administrative officers often 
collected surtaxes granted by the Crown. Since the demand for state services tended to grow 
with time, so did the income of officials. Hence, another interpretation of forced loans and 
augmentations de gages is that the Crown reappropriated part of the rents acruing from civil 
administration. 
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Bien characterized this system of borrowing as mutually 
beneficial for both the Crown and the officer corps. On the one 
hand, the Crown gained access to low-cost borrowing. Indeed, 
Bien compared this system of borrowing to the efficiency of the 
English system, accorded by the involvement of Parliament. As 
for the officer corps, they benefited from the implicit under-
standing that the Crown would not create redundant new offices 
and would thereby maintain intact the privileges of officers and 
the value of their positions. 
Bien's likening of this system to the parliamentary control 
over finances in England neglects significant indications that the 
Crown/ corps relationship in France may have not been so mu-
tually beneficial. In post-1688 England, Parliament's promise to 
fund the debt practically eliminated the risk to all investors, since 
Parliament had the necessary control over fiscal policy to back up 
its commitments. In the case of the Crown/ corps relationship in 
France, however, the risk of default did not disappear. Rather, 
the Crown transferred it from the creditors to the venal officer 
corps, which then found itself dependent upon the Crown's 
commitment to pay the increased gages. 7 
Bien mentioned this transfer of risk and the possibility that 
the king could very well have been "late in supplying the gages 
to the corps or . . . [could have provided) nothing at all," but 
dismissed the risk as unimportant because it was well defined and 
the officers held only "limited liability" while in the corps. Yet, 
Bien ignored the effect that "defaults" would have had on the 
7 Parliamentary systems have the ability to default on their debts. That the British honored 
theirs has much to do with the political influence of bondholders in Parliament; the institution 
itself was only one factor of the set that reduced default. 
Some scholars examining regional political relations uphold the notion that the French 
Crown failed to keep the promises that it made to local privileged bodies. Daniel Ligou, for 
example, described how the Crown undermined the interests of the deputies to the Estates 
of Burgundy, despite the Estates' repeated willingness to pay the Crown to halt the intro-
duction of venality into their ranks. The deputies went along with the Crown's expectations, 
but then never realized the gains to which Bien's model alludes. Nora Temple also wrote of 
a one-sided relationship between the Crown and the municipal corps, in which the Crown 
benefited from its ability to create and alter privileges while the municipal corps bore the 
costs. In both cases, the Crown enjoyed the freedom to request sums repeatedly that the 
corps had already paid to preserve their privileges (Ligou, "Les Elus Generaux de Bourgogne 
et !es charges municipales de 1692 a 1789," Actes du 9oeme Congres National des Societes Savantes: 
Section d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, I [ 1965], 95-rro; Temple, "The Control and Ex-
ploitation of French Towns During the Ancien Regime," in Raymond F. Kierstead [ed.], 
State and Society and Seventeenth Century France [New York, l 97 5], So). 
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value of offices if a corps were unable to meet its obligations on 
account of the Crown's failure to pay its gages. Most important, 
Bien dismissed the possibility that once an office was purchased, 
the holder had no choice but to go along and assume the risk for 
the king's debts if he wanted to preserve the value of his invest-
ment. Never, for instance, does Bien mention the term "forced 
loan," which has become commonplace in the historiography of 
Old Regime public finance, though forced loans clearly do seem 
to apply to his model in which the Crown wields privilege to an 
almost coercive degree. 8 
Beik went much further than Bien in underscoring the co-
operation and mutual benefit between the Crown and elites in 
his model of successful absolutist rule. According to Beik in his 
study of the provincial rulers of Languedoc from 1630 to 1680, 
the Crown governed best when not in constant contention with 
privileged elites. Contention between the Crown and provincial 
elites, Beik argued, marked the first half of the seventeenth century 
when privileges and property rights remained ill defined and 
subject to royal intervention. Upon assuming the throne, Louis 
XIV worked to end the costly politics of contention that had fed 
opposition movements and popular rebellions, including-most 
significantly for him-the Fronde. He ceased both to undermine 
property rights and to use privilege as a bargaining chip against 
local groups. Implicitly, he guaranteed an informal status quo 
regarding privilege and the prerogatives of corporations; the pro-
vincial rulers, in tum, ceased their agitation. Louis XIV also 
worked within the existing clientele framework through which 
power disseminated throughout the provinces. By virtue of his 
personal prestige, the king was able to expand the patronage 
system laterally and center it upon himself, ensuring that mem-
bership as a king's client remained profitable, respectable, and 
attractive to provincial elites. 9 
Hence, Beik's model of effective absolutist rule depended on 
a strong, personal rule by the monarch in which the king com-
manded the incentive structure and clearly set the agenda for 
others to follow. The elites, on the other hand, reacted by adher-
8 Bien, "Offices," ro6. 
9 William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France (New York, 1985), 
217-218, 243-244. 
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ing to and thereby profiting from the wishes of the Crown. In 
the realm of finances, the Crown did not need to use privilege 
as leverage against the corps. Rather, local municipalities and the 
Estates of Languedoc willingly agreed with the Crown on the 
level of their dons gratuits and borrowed to meet part or all of 
those obligations. Mostly local elites bought the resulting Estates' 
bonds, thereby further ensuring their profitable positions within 
the financial regime; much as the Crown implicitly secured privi-
leges, so too did it honor its obligations to municipalities and 
Estates. 
Thus, in Beik's view, privileged elites became involved in 
royal finances as Bien suggested, but without the more explicit 
coercion integral to Bien's model. Another key difference be-
tween the two models of absolutist rule established by Bien and 
Beik lies in the degree to which the Crown honored its commit-
ments to the privileged corps. For the corps to have entered 
willingly into this so-called mutual relationship, as both Bien and 
Beik suggested, the Crown's commitment to respect those prop-
erty rights in the future must have been credible. Beik convinc-
ingly argued that the Crown did honor its commitments to the 
Languedocian elites between 1650 and 1680, but Bien's model 
occupied a fine line between the tenuousness of privilege and the 
security of property rights. The tenuousness of privilege gave the 
Crown leverage over the corps, but privilege had to be secure as 
a property right to attract investors in the first place. 
Important differences separate these two models of absolutist 
rule and public finance. They both considered the same political 
cast of characters, namely, the Crown and the privileged elites, 
but they pointed to different dynamics in their political and 
financial relationships. This observation is not to suggest that one 
model is more accurate than the other. Rather, the two models 
and the distinctions between them suggest precisely what we hope 
to demonstrate-that differing political arrangements existed si-
multaneously between the Crown and its lenders; that changes in 
these arrangements over time did not represent a linear progres-
sion toward liberal credit markets, voluntary arrangements, and 
low risk of default; and that differences over space mostly reflected 
the particular institutional relations between specific regional or 
local bodies and the Crown. 
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THE CROWN AND THE ESTATES OF BURGUNDY As early as 1660, 
the Estates of Burgundy raised money for the Crown, much like 
Bien's officer corps did. Between 1660 and 1789, they raised in 
excess of 142 million livres. The Estates of Brittany, Languedoc, 
and Artois were equally active. Since the combined debts of the 
pays d'Etats amounted to one-sixth of all the Crown's perpetual 
debts in 1789, such borrowing was hardly a negligible means of 
public finance. Like the venal officer corps, the Estates were a 
widely accepted means to raise capital quickly and inexpensively 
under the Old Regime. Venal officers were the dominant source 
of long-term finance under Louis XIV; the Estates became more 
important under Louis XV and XVI. 10 
The dissimilarity between the Estates and the officer corps 
was reflected in their respective relationships with the Crown. 
Unlike venal officers, deputies to the Estates held no financial 
stake in their institution; they did not risk losing any personal 
savings invested in their positions. Yet, they did have an interest 
in protecting their provinces' privileges, particularly those that 
benefited local elites. Therefore, the Estates could very well have 
felt coercive pressure from the Crown to raise loans at its behest. 
The Crown applied leverage by creating, or threatening to create, 
offices in the provinces, with the expectation that the Estates 
would buy them all back in one large repurchase, or rachat. The 
Estates agreed to the rachats to preserve the provinces' privileges 
and to defend the interests of the local elite. With the king's 
permission the Estates borrowed whatever sums were needed for 
the rachats and guaranteed their loans by earmarking specific 
revenues as collateral. In these cases, the Crown approached the 
Estates much as it did specific venal officer corps: it used privilege 
as an indirect coercion in order to borrow money via rachats. 11 
JO C 4573, Archives Departmentales (A.D.) de la Cote d'Or. See Rapport de la Commission 
des Finances de la Convention Nationale (Paris, l 79 3), 4; Marcel Marion, Histoire Financiere de 
La France (Paris, 1927-1931), I, 459-474; II, 131-132. According to Marion, the value of 
venal offices was nearly the same in 1715 and 1789 (I, 62; II, 131). As our data suggest, the 
debts of the pays d'Etat rose rapidly over the course of the century. 
l l See n. 7 for Ligou's account of the attempts by deputies from the Estates of Burgundy 
to preserve their autonomy over municipal government. In addition, members of the Estates 
held an interest in controlling as much of the public expenditures within their province as 
possible (Beik, Absolutism, 258-270). 
In l 700, the Estates repurchased offices created by twenty-four edicts for the sum of 
922,000 livres, of which they borrowed 522,000. Among the venal offices so created and 
suppressed were town governors (gouverneurs dans les villes), treasurers of communal exchanges 
(tresoriers des bourses communes), and controllers of marriage proclamations (controleurs des bans 
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By contrast, lenders to the Estates came forth voluntarily. The 
Estates had no mechanism by which to force individuals into 
lending them funds for the rachats, even when indirect royal 
coercion had led them to issue bonds. This element of voluntary 
investment suggests that the Estates remained capable of ensuring 
the safety of their own bonds despite the Crown's leverage over 
privileged elites and despite the Crown's ability to coerce the 
Estates to act as a financial intermediary. 
For such an arrangement to have worked to the benefit of 
all involved and to have attracted the investors that it did, both 
the Estates and the Crown had to adhere to their commitments, 
at least in theory. For its part, the Crown had to respect the 
revenues that it accorded to the Estates as collateral for the bonds; 
the king could not reassign such revenues or diminish them in 
any way. In reality, though, the king did sometimes try to divert 
revenues committed to funding the Estates' debt, but invariably 
with the vigorous opposition of the Estates, which fought to 
preserve their reputation as a major borrower. Usually the Estates 
were successful in constraining the Crown, but sometimes they 
lost their case. In this instance, the Crown and the Estates were 
not necessarily cooperating to reduce borrowing costs; rather, the 
Estates were trying to constrain the Crown to protect their own 
interests. The Estates were unable to assure lenders that loan 
contracts would be honored in all instances; in other words, the 
Estates could not make an absolute commitment to repay the 
loans. Nonetheless, they were able to issue bonds that were 
significantly safer than those issued directly by the Crown. The 
arrangement was advantageous to the Estates, the Crown, and 
their creditors. 12 
de mariage) (C 3019, Registre des transcriptions des decrets des Etats, fol. 69, A. D. Cote d'Or). 
The Estates also repurchased Burgundian municipal offices in 1692, 1714-1717, 1726, 1733, 
1764-1766, and 1773, thus ''.joining and uniting" the offices to their institution. That is to 
say, the offices continued to exist after their repurchase, but they were not venal. The Estates, 
along with the governor and the intendant, could then fill the offices as they wished (Ligou, 
"Elus Generaux," 97). 
l 2 In l 708, the Estates succeeded in halting the Crown's granting of merchant passports 
that had been causing a diminution of the revenues from the octrois de la Sa8ne, the tolls along 
the Sa6ne river. In 1701, on the other hand, the Estates faced a rare loss of these revenues 
when the Crown diminished the lease of the octrois by 40,000 livres as compensation to tax 
farmers for the momentary cessation of grain exports in 1698-1699 (Potter, "The Octrois de 
la Sa8ne, the Estates of Burgundy and the Royal Fisc under Louis XIV," unpub. ms. [Univ. 
of California, Los Angeles, 1995]). 
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By raising loans through the Estates, the king benefited from 
interest charges that were significantly lower than what he would 
have paid had he borrowed directly from the public. Between 
1660 and 1770, credit-worthy private borrowers paid between 4 
and 5 percent for long-term annuities. Meanwhile, the Crown 
was rarely able to borrow at a rate less than 5 percent. Even those 
royal bonds that nominally paid 5 percent were issued at a steep 
discount, especially in periods of warfare, thereby effectively rais-
ing the rate of interest. The Estates issued their debt at 5 percent 
in peace time and 5.55 percent in war time. In both cases, their 
accounts show that they raised the full nominal value of the bonds. 
After the return to monetary stability in l 726, the Crown always 
had to offer significantly more than 5 percent and still forego 
receiving the full face value of its annuities. In fact, after 1770, 
new issues of long-term annuities earned nearly 8 percent. Nev-
ertheless, the Estates continued to issue their debt at 5 percent and 
raise the full nominal value of the bonds right up to 1789. Since 
the differential persisted for more than a century, it seems likely 
that investors recognized the significant guarantee that the Estates 
offered them in constraining the Crown against default. 13 
The elites of the province must have valued the Estates' 
financial dealings in a number of ways. Indeed, Burgundian elites 
had vast opportunities for low-risk investment with returns usually 
ranging between 4 and 5.5 percent-on average what the uncer-
tain private market offered. Further, as a corporate body repre-
senting the interests of local elites, the Estates increased their 
prominence from the control that they accrued over resources and 
from the credibility that they attained as guarantors both of pro-
vincial privileges and of private investments. Hence, the Estates' 
officers never had to mortgage personally possessed property, as 
did venal officers when they borrowed for the king. Rather, the 
Estates mortgaged specific anticipated revenues to guarantee re-
payment of principal on their debts. The risk assumed by the 
Estates, therefore, was much less than that assumed by the venal 
office corps. Only reputation, not property, was at stake in serving 
as a financial intermediary for the Crown, and the delegates to 
l 3 Philip Hoffinan, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, "Private Credit Markets in Paris, 
1690-1840,"journal of Economic History, LII (1992), 302; Velde and Weir, "Financial Market," 
2!. 
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the Estates (elus) recognized the importance of their credit repu-
tation, as their deliberations demonstrate: 
At the time when the province needs to borrow, she usually 
announces the date at which these debts will begin to be reim-
bursed. Yet in the years that pass between the issue of a debt and 
its reimbursement, it happens now and then that some creditors 
need their capital, and that they ask to be reimbursed. We are not 
required, in truth, to anticipate the contracted time at which the 
principal is to be repaid. But it appears to us that it is of a wise 
administration to grant the wishes of those who by the loan of 
their moneys have helped the province. This practice can never 
be very onerous to a pays d'Etats and it will be very useful when 
we borrow again. 14 
With reputation, not personal property, at risk in the case of 
a royal default, the Estates might well be expected to have acted 
willingly as financial intermediary for the Crown. Ironically, 
Bien's contention of mutual benefit applies more to the role of 
the provincial Estates as financial intermediaries than it does to his 
example of the officer corps filling the same capacity. 
True, the Estates never attained sovereign control over the 
financial issues that they mediated. In times of particularly acute 
need, the costs that the Estates could impose on the Crown may 
have paled in comparison with the benefits that the Crown would 
derive from default. Thus, the Estates could not prevent the 
defaults of 1698, 1714-1722, and 1766-1770; nor could they shield 
investors from the negative consequences of the monetary ma-
nipulations that repeatedly reduced the silver content of the livre 
between 1700 and 1726. The Estates never acted as the French 
14 On the importance of low-risk, low-return investments in the portfolios of the early 
modern French elite, see George V. Taylor, "Non Capitalist Wealth and the Origins of the 
French Revolution," American Historical Review, LXXII (1967), 469-496. 
By itself, the difference in risk assumed by the venal officers and the Estates would 
suggest that loans to the former were the safer of the two. By the edict of February l 68 3, 
lenders to venal officers who had registered their lien on the offices with the keeper of seals 
enjoyed priority in claims on the office in the case of default. Lenders to the Estates, on the 
other hand, had no legal claims on tangible assets. A diminution of earmarked revenues 
brought about either by royal intervention or by acts of God would have forced the Estates 
to reschedule their debts, a move against which the bondholders had no legal recourse. Thus, 
the relative safety of Estates' bonds must necessarily have arisen out of the political ability of 
the Estates to constrain the Crown (Paul Louis-Lucas, Etude sur la venalite des charges etfonctions 
publiques [Paris, 1882), II, 312-398). C 4569, February 18, 1773, A.D. Cote d'Or. 
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equivalent of the post-1688 English Parliament. They never en-
joyed the sovereignty over financial matters necessary to prevent 
default in all cases. Nevertheless, the Estates did succeed in pres-
suring the Crown to avoid default more successfully than other 
intermediating bodies, while they enjoyed privilege and prestige 
on the regional level. Furthermore, they were often able to 
mitigate the consequences of default. As we show later, the Estates 
used timely reimbursements to reduce the impact of royal edicts 
that unilaterally reduced interest payments. Individuals who were 
reimbursed after a default recovered their entire capital and were 
free to invest it however they chose. 
The Crown never carried out this reimbursement process on 
the annuities that it issued directly through the Hotel de Ville de 
Paris. The Crown clearly treated the financial obligations raised 
through the intermediation of the Estates of Burgundy differently 
than it did such standard government bonds as rentes on the Hotel 
de Ville de Paris. Indeed, there would have been no need to raise 
loans through the Estates if the Crown intended to treat those 
bonds like any others. A perceptible scale was at work on which 
Estates' bonds ranked at relatively low risk, thereby drawing sub-
stantial voluntary subscription. 
THE ESTATES' LOANS 
The Process ef Debt Issue The process of debt issue was 
straightforward, changing little during the period from 1660 to 
1790. In the face of an unexpected contingency or in response to 
a royal request, the Estates would deliberate and authorize its 
treasurer to borrow a certain sum. In most cases, both the local 
judicial and fiscal authorities (the Parlement of Dijon and the 
Chamber of Accounts of Dijon) had to approve the loan issue. 
For the next few months, individuals would subscribe to the loan 
issue either in person or through an intermediary. The treasurer 
then would turn to a pair of notaries to write up the loan contracts 
and later compile a register of all the lenders. The bulk of our 
information comes from these registers. 15 
Legally, all Estates' loans were rentes perpetuelles; that is, they 
were bonds that required borrowers (the Estates, in this case) to 
15 In the case of the annual don gratuit and the triannual voyage d'honneur, loans were raised 
without consulting the Parlement or the Chamber of Accounts. Loans for extraordinary 
purposes, however, required that these authorities be systematically consulted. 
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make only annual interest payments and left them free to decide 
when to repay the capital. In practice, however, and unlike the 
king's rentes perpetuelles, Estates' loans were term debts; hence, the 
schedule of capital repayment was broadly known in advance. 
Indeed, as already stated, when the Estates issued a bond, they 
mortgaged specific future tax revenues to pay both interest and 
principal. As these revenues accrued, the treasurer of the Estates 
paid off the bonds by randomly selecting contracts. 
Within these guidelines, the Estates interacted with the 
Crown in at least four different ways to raise funds, in all cases 
needing royal permission to float loans and earmark revenues. The 
first, which was also the least important in frequency and volume 
throughout most of the period under study, was to borrow for 
provincial affairs. Loans were raised to fund such projects as the 
construction of a king's statue, the triennial voyage d'honneur to 
Paris to present the king with provincial petitions, or the con-
struction of canals. Existing documentation leaves ambiguous the 
question of which revenues the Estates used as collateral for these 
loans, though it seems that they committed revenues that normally 
would have been spent in Burgundy. Second, the Estates regularly 
borrowed to finance all or part of the taxes that they had to remit 
to the Crown, such as the don gratuits, the subsistence, the exemp-
tion, and the capitation, which they would defray with such reve-
nues as the crues de sel and the octrois de la Saone, periodically 
granted by the king, involving a shift from direct to indirect 
taxation. Third, they raised loans to repurchase edicts, particularly 
edicts creating offices or issuing augmentations de gages. Although 
these loans were guaranteed against similar Crown-granted reve-
nues, they required an absolute increase in the tax burden. 16 
l 6 In l 686, the Estates borrowed ro,ooo livres for the erection of a statue of Louis XIV 
(C 3380, Etat de !'administration des Elus pendant la trienalite, A.D. Cote d'Or). Borrowing for 
canals reached significant levels toward the end of the eighteenth century. 
In principle, the don gratuit, the subsistence, the exemption, and the capitation 
represented ordinary annual payments due to the Crown and funded with direct taxes levied 
against the provinces' nonexempt inhabitants. Though collected jointly, each of these taxes 
had different historical roots and, hence, were given separate mention in the Estates' account 
books. By borrowing sums against indirect tax revenues to supplement them, the Estates were 
effectively transforming direct tax obligations in the present into future indirect tax obligations. 
For example, in 17rr, they borrowed 266,666 livres against revenues from the local salt tax, 
or the crues de sel, of l 7 l 3 to cover the entire amount due the current year as their don 
gratuit; and between 1702 and 1709, the Estates borrowed 416,000 livres anually against future 
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Finally, the Estates agreed to borrow sums for the Crown in 
return for a specific future decrease in annual tax transfers to the 
Crown. The Crown would typically surrender an annual sum, 
equal to one-tenth of the capital of the loan, from its ordinary 
Burgundian revenues, which the Estates used to pay the interest 
and the capital of the loans. This type of loan, along with those 
floated for provincial affairs, represents the Estates' most voluntary 
arrangement; the Crown gained access to capital through the 
intermediation of the Estates without directly wielding the ele-
ment of privilege as a bargaining chip. To be sure, all of the loans 
funded by the Estates involved an element of implicit coercion. 
If the Crown had not found the Estates so willing to be partners 
in debt issue, it may well have decided to circumvent them in 
local financial matters. Yet, coercion was limited because these 
loans availed both the Estates and the Crown. The loans enhanced 
the prestige of the Estates and made them valuable associates of 
the Crown, and the king gained a cheap source of credit. In 
contrast, the rachats, or repurchase of edicts, were explicitly co-
ercive, since the Crown required the Estates to borrow funds in 
order to preserve provincial privileges. 17 
Figure r demonstrates that c. 1730 the most coercive arrange-
ments began to give way, indicating a clear evolution in the 
relationship between the Crown and the Estates, and that the 
Estates must have preempted the creation of many an edict by 
providing the Crown with added revenue, since at no time did 
the Estates commit more than half of their borrowed funds to 
repurchase offices. Figure r also shows that as the Crown shifted 
away from coercive measures, the Estates massively increased their 
borrowing on its behalf 
The close connection between bond issues and the commit-
ment of specific financial resources involved in all four types of 
arrangement was what made the Estates' loans particularly attrac-
tive to investors. The assurance of repayment within a few years 
revenues from the octrois de la Saone to help pay the r million livres that it transferred 
annually as the province's capitation (C 3388, Etat de !'administration des elus, fol. 33 r-332; 
C 2982-2983, Registres des privileges, A.D. Cote d'Or). 
r7 There is an element of coercion to the second type of arrangement as well. Insofar as 
the Crown could unilaterally set the amounts paid annually to it in the form of subsistence, 
capitation, etc., the Estates were left with the narrow choice between borrowing part of the 
sums against future indirect tax revenues or paying the full amounts through present direct 
taxation. 
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Fig. 1 Purpose of Burgundian Loan Issues 
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SOURCE C 2982, 2983, 3388, 4560-4572, 4573, 4576-4588, 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 
4618, 4625-4628, 4631, 4632, 4634, 4649, and 4727, Archives Departementales de la Cote 
d'Or. 
limited the losses that followed upon royal defaults. Take for 
example Benigne de Machecot, lord of Premaux, and a counselor 
at the Parlement of Dijon, who invested 7 ,ooo livres in a bond 
issue in 1692. He expected to earn an annual payment of 5.55 
percent on his capital, or 3 8 5 livres. The Estates reimbursed 
Machecot in 1697, and, that same year, he made them a new loan 
for the same 7 ,ooo livres at the same interest rate. However, with 
the coming of peace in 1698, the Crown reduced all interest 
payments to 5 percent, resulting in an income loss of lo percent 
for Machecot. Nevertheless, he was reimbursed all of his principal 
in l70I. Within a year, Machecot loaned at least 9,000 livres to 
the Estates, an investment that again yielded 5.55 percent (with 
the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession, the Estates raised 
the rate on their bonds). So, as a result of the 1698 default, 
Machecot had lost none of his capital and only a small share of 
his interest payments (rn percent for the years between 1698 and 
1701). Had he invested in rentes on the Hotel de Ville in Paris, 
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he would never have regained his capital and would have received 
payments of only 5 percent all the way to the default of 1714, 
when his interest payments would have been cut yet again. 18 
Clearly, investing in the Estates was safer than investing 
directly in the Crown. Risks still existed, but the remaining 
sources of uncertainty (monetary manipulations and interest-rate 
reductions) were unavoidable in any financial investment, either 
in the public or the private sector. By reimbursing on schedule, 
the Estates assured their lenders that most of their risk concerned 
interest payments, not their capital. 
The Bondholders The Estates issues thousands of annuities 
during the 130 years of their activity that we can follow. These 
annuities hold crucial information about the process whereby the 
Crown secured resources. 19 
The Estates of Burgundy turned to a bewildering array of 
creditors, from princes of the blood to lowly spinsters in small 
Burgundian towns. The issue of why individuals provided funds 
to the Estates shows its relevance in the fact that, at best, only a 
fraction of the investors could have been compelled to do so. 
Some lenders-like Phelypeaux de Pontchartrain, Chancellor of 
France-appear to have had obvious stakes in the success of 
government policy. Others-like Jean de Berbisey, president of 
the Parlement of Dijon, or Louis de Foudras, deputy of the Estates 
for the nobility-had a strong interest in the preservation of 
provincial autonomy. Yet, for a surprisingly large number of the 
lenders, the preservation of the Estates was of little importance, 
at least until that moment when they invested in the Estates' 
bonds. Most lenders seem to have held the bonds because they 
had freely purchased them as investments-not because of any 
sense of duty, let alone provincial or royal duress. 20 
r8 The relevant loans are found in C4578, fol. 6rv (14/ 4/1692); C4579, fol. 29r (7i2/r697); 
C4580, fol. 5ov (9/rlr7or); C4580, fol. 342r (4/8/r707), A.D. Cote d'Or. In all, Machecot 
advanced money to the Estates twenty-five times between 1692 and 1712. 
19 Our data set includes 14,171 initial investment contracts and r,958 contracts concerning 
resales. Using the data from our sample, we estimate that the Estates must have issued about 
20,000 bonds during the period. 
20 Phelypeaux loaned money to the Estates on three separate occasions in 1720. The 
Berbisey family made seventy loans to the Estates between 1664 and 1749, most of which 
by the president of the Parlement of Dijon in the late seventeenth century. Foudras, for his 
part, made sixteen loans, and another eight were made by Jacques de Foudras, his relative, 
who also served in the Estates. 
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The very diversity of investors argues against any sort of 
coercive arrangement between the Crown, or the Estates, and the 
bondholders. To begin with, a surprisingly large share of the 
lenders were women, plebeian as well as aristocratic in origin (see 
Table 2). Although married women subscribers are most often 
hidden because scribes recorded only their husbands' names, wid-
ows and spinsters appear prominently in the record. Women as a 
group comprise 24 percent of the lenders. Widows outnumber 
spinsters by nearly a factor of two. However, the number of 
spinsters grew so dramatically that, after 1730, women who in-
vested in Burgundian bonds were equally likely to be spinsters as 
widows. This proportion was similar to what has been found for 
other types of government bonds. Although a despotic govern-
ment might well have forced entire families to contribute to the 
Estates' loans, this strategy does not fit the French case; whenever 
the Crown targeted specific corps or groups in an effort to raise 
funds, it never extended its pressure beyond the individuals who 
composed that group. Apart from the quantitative evidence, the 
identities of the women further suggest that many of them were 
not even remotely connected to the Estates. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine either the widow of Jean-Baptiste Colbert or Marie 
Madeleine Fournet, a Parisian spinster, being required by anyone 
to invest in the Burgundian loans. Rather, women, whether 
unmarried or widowed, saw the Estates' bonds as safe investments 
for their wealth, dowries, or widows' portions. 21 
The same disconnection between the Estates and lenders is 
evident in the consideration of social origin or residence. Since 
both indicators show substantial evolution between 1660 and 
1790, we discuss them in detail in the next section. Nonetheless, 
the aggregate evidence is telling. More than half of the lenders 
were not Burgundians, though some of them were of Burgundian 
21 Widows appear in slightly less than 2,400 contracts, lending 2r.8 million livres to the 
Estates. Spinsters appear in l,350 contracts, lending 7.5 million. Yet , spinsters appear in nearly 
three times as many contracts (940 relative to 343) after 1730 than before 1720, whereas 
widows appear in roughly the same number of contracts (1,300 relative to 900). Hallinan, 
Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, "Private Credit Markets," suggest that women made up only 
about 20% of the lenders to the Crown in Paris. For a discussion of the Chambres de 
Justice--quasijudicial proceedings through which the Crown attempted to have financiers 
return part of their profits--see Dessert, A rgent, 23 8-257. For loans funded by corporations, 
see Bien, "Offices," 89-114. Colbert's widow loaned money to the Estates three times in 
1696, and the Colbert clan appears sixteen times in the records. 
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Table 2 Sex of Burgundian Bondholders 
DECADE SHARE OF FUNDS LOANED 
STARTING 
IN WOMEN(%) MEN AND FAMILIES (%) INSTITUTIONS (%) 
I66o 7.62 85.ro 7.27 
I670 22.03 7r.47 6.50 
I68o 27.27 68.I6 4.57 
I690 22.25 73.7I 4.04 
I700 I6.79 78.I5 5.06 
I7IO 22.82 72.88 4.30 
I720 23.7I 73.60 2.69 
I730 20.80 72.39 6.8I 
I740 25.65 7r.7I 2.64 
I750 23.43 72.76 3.8I 
I760 26.20 68.97 4.84 
I770 39.79 56.97 3.24 
I780 24.62 64.49 IO.So 
SOURCE C 4573 , 4576, 4577, 4578, 4579, 4580, 4581, 4582, 4583, 4584, 4585, 4586, 4587, 
4588, 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618, 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4649, 4727, Archives 
Departmentales de la Cote d'Or. 
origin-like the Bossuet family-or had regional connections-
like Marguerite Brunet de Raney, the widow of Pierre Arnault 
de la Briffe, who had been the intendant of Burgundy. At least 
30 percent of the lenders were of third-estate status, and only 
about half of the bonds were bought by officeholders. Taking into 
account that these bonds were issued in Burgundy, the distribution 
of holders is not significantly different from that found in Paris, 
save for one characteristic: Virtually no foreigners lent to the 
Estates. 22 
22 In the l 67os, Jacques Benigne Bossuet, a councillor at the Parlement of Dijon, initiated 
the family's investment in Burgundian bonds; the practice continued for another fifty years. 
Third-estate lenders accounted for at least 20% of the value of the funds raised and 
officeholders for nearly two-thirds. In each case, the reported figures are undercounts, since 
individuals were not required to mention their office in the bond contracts; nor were they 
required to report their social standing. Nonetheless, careful analysis of occupations and the 
collation of information about individuals who recur frequently in the data allow us to 
attribute a social standing to nearly 80% of male subscribers. Although there is no reason to 
think that the social class of women bondholders was different from that of men, the social 
information in their contracts is much more limited, leaving nearly half of them unclassified. 
Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal have found that the proportion of foreign 
lenders to the Crown in Paris grew from near nothing before 1700 to almost 20% during 
the American Revolutionary War ("An Unconventional but Stable Credit System: Paris 
1726-1789," unpub. ms. [1996]). 
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Thus, in the aggregate, lender-clientele characteristics are 
inconsistent with the supposition that the Crown coerced inves-
tors into subscribing to debt issues. Furthermore, unlike the situ-
ation elsewhere in early modern Europe, the composition of the 
creditor group is too socially diverse to explain why the Crown 
allowed the Estates' bonds to be safer than its own. No powerful 
interest group had sufficient investments in these bonds to warrant 
political action to avoid default. In short, Burgundian bonds 
appear to have been safe for anyone who invested in them. 
Change over Time The aggregate data concerning bond-
holders bears startling evidence that the last century of the Old 
Regime was a period of significant political and economic evo-
lution. The residence of the Estates' creditors during two distinct 
periods, 1660 to 1713 and 1726 to 1789, is displayed in Table 3 
and Figure 2. Between the beginning and the end of Louis XIV's 
reign, Burgundians reduced their relative contributions to Estates' 
loans by more than 50 percent, and by the 1740s, their share was 
a mere quarter of what it had been in the l68os. Close examina-
tion of the lending patterns decade by decade reveals that before 
1690, the Estates raised more than 80 percent of their funds in 
Dijon or from aristocrats nearby. The only exceptions were a few 
Table 3 Bondholders' Residences 
NUMBER OF CONTRACTS VALUE OF LOANS 
(%) (%) 
RESIDENCE I660-I7I3 I726-1789 I660-I7I3 I726-1789 
Dijon 68 I8 60 I8 
Burgundy l7 IO I2 9 
Paris 9 44 I9 57 
France 4 4 5 5 
Abroad and unknown 3 7 4 IO 
NOTE Burgundy denotes residences in Burgundy other than Dijon (including unknown 
in Burgundy); Paris includes Versailles and Chantilly (the country estate of the dukes of 
Conde, governors of Burgundy). France denotes residences in France other than Dijon, 
Burgundy, or Paris (including unknown in France but not in Burgundy). Individuals who 
could not be allocated with certainty to Burgundy and the rest of France we placed in the 
unknown category. Foreigners subscribed to only 132 contracts, 93 of which were signed 
after 1740. 
SOURCE C 4573, 4576, 4577, 4578, 4579, 4580, 4581, 4582, 4583, 4584, 4585, 4586, 4587, 
4588, 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618, 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4649, 4727, Archives 
Departrnentales de la Cote d'Or. 
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Fig. 2 Residence of Burgundian Bondholders 
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SOURCE C 4573, 4576, 4577, 4578, 4579, 4580, 4581, 4582, 4583, 4584, 4585, 4586, 
4587, 4588, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618, 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4649, and 4727, Archives 
Departementales de la Cote d'Or. 
relatively small loans raised in Paris, perhaps because of some 
unexpected expense encountered by the province's agents in the 
capital. As the demands of the Crown mounted, the Estates 
managed simultaneously to increase the capital supplied locally 
and to reach out to new sources of funds. In the last twenty years 
of Louis XIV's life, Parisians and provincials outside Burgundy 
gradually increased their share to c. 25 percent of the funds 
raised.23 
The decade of the 17ros marked the beginning of a major 
change. Within twenty years, the Estates were raising the bulk of 
their capital in Paris rather than in Dijon. After 1720, Burgundians 
never again supplied more than half of the funds. That the Estates 
moved much of their fund-raising from Dijon to Paris just when 
23 In their negotiations with the Crown, Estates representatives found it expedient to 
"gratify" members of the royal bureaucracy. In other instances, they borrowed in Paris to 
commission a statue of the king for Dijon (C4576, 1686, A.D. Cote d'Or). Such loans before 
1710, all of which were small, do not suggest that the Estates were raising capital in Paris 
systematically. 
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the Crown was initiating a massive increase in its direct solicitation 
of funds from savers via Parisian notaries leaves little doubt that 
the second half of the eighteenth century signified an important 
step in the creation of a national capital market. Indeed, the rise 
in the share of loans subscribed by Parisians coincided with the 
increased financial activity of notaries in Paris. These improve-
ments in intermediation must have facilitated the broadening of 
the market in Burgundian bonds. Yet, these innovations in finan-
cial markets seem insufficient on their own to explain the increas-
ing appeal of the Estates' bonds. What political and economic 
factors made it attractive for non-Burgundians to hold an increas-
ing fraction of the Estates' debts?24 
Examination of the occupational distribution of creditors 
finds a secular change just as dramatic as the new geographic 
distribution. Judicial officers and financial officers, who had ac-
counted for nearly half of all money lent to the Estates before 
Table 4 Social Origins of Bondholders 
SHARE OF CONTRACTS (%) VALUE 01' LOANS (%) 
SOCIAL CATEGORY I660-I7I3 I727-I789 I660-I7I3 I727-I789 
Royal officers 3 7 5 IO 
Military 2 6 4 IO 
Nobles 6 I I 8 I6 
Financial officers 20 8 I9 9 
Judicial officers 25 9 30 IO 
Estate officers 5 2 6 2 
Trade, crafts, professions 22 34 I6 27 
Clergy 6 5 5 4 
Institutions 5 IO 3 6 
Unknown women 5 IO 3 6 
Unknown men 2 2 2 
NOTE The period 1714-1726 was omitted. 
SOURCE C 4573, 4576, 4577, 4578, 4579, 4580, 4581, 4582, 4583, 4584, 4585, 4586, 4587, 
4588, 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618, 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4649, 4727, Archives 
Departmentales de la Cote d'Or. 
24 See Hoffinan, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, "Economie et Politique, Les Marches du 
credit a Paris, 1750-1840," Annales, I (1994), 65-98. 
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Fig. 3 Occupatons of Burgundian Bondholders 
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1713, saw their portion of total contributions dwindle to less than 
a fifth (see Table 4 and Figure 3). In contrast, the third estate, 
broadly defined, fairly doubled its lending to the Estates. In 
particular, individuals from the trades and crafts nearly quadrupled 
their share of the loan issues. Also increasing dramatically was the 
participation of military officers, nobles, and royal officers, includ-
ing secretaires du roi and royal administrators. A significant increase 
also occurred for domestics and professionals, although it was 
smaller. 
The purpose of discussion makes it convenient to group 
bondholders into three categories: first, elites who did not hold 
local administrative positions (including nobles, military officers, 
secretaires du roi, and officers of the king); second, officers affili-
ated with local corporate bodies (including judicial, financial, and 
Estates officers); and last, the third estate (including servants, 
tradesmen, crafts, and the professions). The foundations of the first 
group's political authority are ambiguous. To the extent that they 
were endowed with political authority, it likely came from per-
sonal or direct links to the Crown. The second group clearly 
corresponds to the corporate sector in Bien's thesis about Crown-
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elite cooperation; individuals in this second group often mediated 
their relationship to the Crown through their local corporations. 
(The argument about Crown-elite cooperation proposed by Beik 
relates to both the first and the second group of investors.) The 
third group includes all those with little apparent ability to put 
pressure on either the Crown or the Estates. Table 5 presents the 
decadal contributions of these three groups. 
The participation of local corporate officers as bondholders 
declined drastically starting in the 1710s, while nobles and the 
military, along with the third estate, increased their subscriptions 
to the bond issues. At precisely this time, the Estates began shifting 
the emphasis from Dijon to Paris as their source of capital. Initially, 
members of the first group, such as nobles and military officers, 
replaced judicial and financial officers. Then, in the 1740s, the 
bourgeoisie and the professions increasingly funded these loans. 
Apparently, under Louis XIV, the Estates relied heavily on the 
Table 5 Bondholders and Political Representation 
SHARES OF TOTAL FUNDS RAISED FROM (%) 
DECADE NOBLES 
BEGINNING MILITARY AND CORPORATE LENDERS WITH NO 
IN ROY AL OFFICERS OFFICERS POLITICAL POWER 
1660 6 76 17 
1670 9 74 16 
1680 16 53 22 
1690 12 62 20 
1700 14 58 23 
1710 27 41 26 
1720 22 49 24 
1730 26 34 33 
1740 46 IS 33 
1750 33 24 40 
1760 43 17 38 
1770 36 20 42 
1780 29 19 48 
NOTE The corporate officers include estate, judicial, and financial officers; the no political 
power category includes trade, crafts, professionals, institutions, and women. Shares do not 
sum to one because two groups (clergy and unknown) have been omitted. 
SOURCE C 4573, 4576, 4577, 4578, 4579, 4580, 4581, 4582, 4583, 4584, 4585, 4586,4587, 
4588, 4597, 4598, 4607, 4616, 4618, 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4649, 4727, Archives Depart-
mentales de la Cote d'Or. 
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financial assistance of the region's own corporate elites, who came 
to the Crown's assistance not only by tinkering unceasingly with 
the value of their offices but also by funding such a large propor-
tion of the bonds. In the first four decades of Louis XIV's personal 
reign, debt financing via annuities did not offer the king a sig-
nificant extension of his borrowing abilities beyond the officer 
corps. That situation changed progressively after 1700. 
To explain this evolution we can appeal either to changes in 
the attitudes of the French people toward bondholding or to 
changes in the institutions that made various types of bonds more 
or less attractive to different individuals. The change in attitudes 
or mentalities might appear to account for the evolution of the 
Burgundian bond market, but this explanation has an uncomfort-
ably modern and capitalist flair. It is also reasonable to suppose 
that the experience of holding bonds began as an involuntary 
process among corporate officers, eventually diffusing to other 
members of the elite and finally to the rest of the population. This 
process presumably would have begun among the very wealthy 
(that is, the aristocrats), for they alone had dispersed landholdings 
and thus some experience in investing in diverse locales. Yet, this 
tale is, at bottom, unsatisfactory; for one thing, private borrowing 
and lending via rentes was widespread and antedated the massive 
increase in government borrowing under Louis XIV. Further-
more, in Paris, at least, the original holders of rentes had been 
bourgeois as well as aristocratic, and members of the third estate 
continued to hold large shares of government bonds in the sev-
enteenth century. Experience with debt was widespread, thereby 
making it difficult to explain why Burgundian bonds gradually 
became more attractive to distant and nonelite borrowers after 
1700.25 
Thus, we must turn to the institutions of debt in Old Regime 
France. The oft-invoked personal links that characterized pre-
capitalist societies suggest that the non-Burgundian elite-the 
Dukes of Conde and their clients, for instance-may have invested 
in Estates' bonds because the great nobles anticipated that in case 
25 For rentes in the countryside, see Rosenthal, "Credit Markets and Economic Change 
in Southeastern France 1630-1788," Explorations in Economic History, XXX (1993), 129-157; 
Michaud, L'eglise et l'ar;;ent sous l'ancien regime (Paris, 1991). Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and 
Rosenthal, "Redistribution and Long-Term Private Debt in Paris 1662-1726, journal of 
Economic History, LV (1995), 256-284. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 22:24:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
POLITICS AND PUBLIC CREDIT IN FRANCE I 603 
of bankruptcy their bonds would be protected, as Jules Mazarin's 
had in the mid-seventeenth century. In such a case, during the 
difficult first two decades of the eighteenth century, they would 
have been in all likelihood the only ones willing to provide funds 
to the Estates. At first glance, the data submit that this was a 
possible scenario. Yet, if they were to have been protected from 
default regardless of the fund to which they subscribed, they 
would have been more likely to invest in higher yielding short-
term paper or rentes on the Hotel de Ville in Paris, which many 
of them held anyway. More important, there is little evidence that 
aristocrats were shielded from defaults and consolidations under 
Louis XIV or his successors.26 
Comparison of the figures for the l7IOS with those of the 
previous decades in tables 3 and 4 discovers that, in Burgundy, 
the social distribution of the individuals who suffered from interest 
reductions as a result of government edicts in 1700, 1714, and 
1720 matches that of the bond issuers in general. Since all bond-
holders were treated in the same way, the arrival of the non-
Burgundian and nonofficeholding elite cannot be attributed to 
speculation based on political connection. Rather, a desire for 
diversification must have motivated investors in the bonds issued 
by the Estates. To mitigate the risks involved in different kinds 
of loans, the elite sought to maintain a range of investments, as 
their probate inventories and research into financial markets in 
Paris suggest. Turning to Burgundian bonds in the last two dec-
ades of Louis XIV's reign was a natural process at a time when 
Parisian bonds seemed increasingly unstable. Holders of any gov-
ernment bond knew that the Crown had not given up its pre-
rogative of selective defaults and that short-term paper was riskier 
than Parisian rentes, which, in turn, were riskier than corporate 
and provincial bonds. If Burgundian bonds were attractive to 
anyone, they must have offered a different palette of risk than 
Parisian rentes.27 
26 In the defaults of 1698, 1714, 1722, and 1766-1770, all Burgundian bonds were treated 
equally, regardless of the identity of the creditors. The issue of selective treatment of creditors 
is more complex, however, since, in any given bond issue, individuals who were promptly 
repaid faced less risk than individuals who were repaid last. Although the data can speak to 
this issue, no obvious patterns have emerged. We reserve a more sophisticated statistical 
analysis for a later article. 
27 Defaults on long-tenn debt occurred in 1698-1700, 1714, 1720-1723, and 1766-1770; 
there were other consolidations of short-term debt by decree. 
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The considerable broadening in the social and geographic 
origins of Burgundian bondholders is testimony that a national 
credit market, however imperfect, was already at work in the 
eighteenth century, involving not just a few bankers but also many 
people who ordinarily might have seemed removed from the 
arcane world of finance. Indeed, the Estates' ability to tap into the 
market for government debt allowed them to mediate three times 
more debt in the five decades after 1740 than in the previous five, 
or even the five decades of heaviest borrowing under Louis XIV. 
Explaining the change in Burgundian debt activity through 
the rise of a national market facilitated by better communication 
and better intermediation is appealing; it removes any requirement 
for political evolution during the Old Regime. Nonetheless, that 
argument is unsatisfactory on a number of counts. First, commu-
nications may not have improved at all in the period from 1720 
to 1750, when the Estates shifted their borrowing from Dijon to 
Paris. Second, if the Estates had enjoyed the political clout to 
ensure the safety of a large debt as early as 1660, it is not clear 
why the Crown did not make use of them as financial interme-
diaries in the early period, or why only local corporate elites 
invested in their bonds at the start. In this case, even in the absence 
of good communications, a far broader distribution of bondhold-
ers in Burgundy might have been expected than what prevailed 
prior to 1726. 
Examining the Crown's relationship to the Estates' indebted-
ness highlights the importance of politics rather than financial 
innovation. Because the Estates paid the interest on their rentes 
on time and maintained their schedule for repaying the principal, 
they borrowed at lower interest, though they absorbed more 
revenue in servicing their debts than did the Hotel de Ville. 
Defaulting on Parisian bonds netted the Crown little more than 
a fraction of the interest-rate charge, whereas transforming Bur-
gundian debt from term to perpetual debt would have allowed 
the Crown to recover half of the tax revenue that it had allocated 
to the Estates-the half that was devoted to reimbursing the 
capital. As the magnitude of the Estates' outstanding debts rose, 
the attractiveness of such a maneuver had to rise. Such a scenario 
is not fanciful. The Crown often reappropriated funds earmarked 
for debt reimbursement-from the Hotel de Ville of Paris and 
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from the clergy, for instance. It often failed to pay interest charges 
on time, and it also failed to maintain the various caisses d'amortis-
sement that it created. Furthermore, the Crown had, legally and 
otherwise, managed to curtail the activities of Estates in many 
regions, including most recently Provence and Normandy. Thus, 
the question of how the Estates came to play an increasingly large 
role in debt financing still needs to be ascertained. 28 
War and Peace Borrowers will reimburse loans only if 
lenders can provide sufficient incentives for them to do so. The 
benefit of default is immediate access to revenues no longer 
devoted to the debt contract, and the punishment is reduced access 
to credit in the future. Thus, the urgency for funds enters into 
any borrower's decision about whether or not to honor a debt. 
Such a mechanism may have been at work for Burgundian bonds: 
The change that occurred after the War of Spanish Succession 
may have reflected a decline in the Crown's need for funds, 
which, in tum, reduced the risk of default. In this scenario, the 
political costs that the Estates and their bondholders could bring 
to bear upon the king would not have changed; rather, the 
Crown's immediate need for funds receded. 
It is conceivable that the reduced intensity of warfare after 
1713 allowed the multifaceted expansion of Burgundian credit. 
Had Louis XV found himself in the throes of a war as intense as 
the War of Spanish Succession, he might have behaved in a 
fashion similar to that of his great grandfather. Hence, the Estates 
would not have been willing to borrow as much as they did. Yet, 
although budgetary realities undoubtedly mattered, the timing of 
the financial markets' evolution is not consistent with the notion 
that war, rather than domestic political relations, was a predomi-
nant causal factor. Indeed, the wars of Louis XIV may have lasted 
longer, but their resource intensities were not much different from 
those of Louis XV or Louis XVI. 29 
28 For the clergy, see Michaud, L'eglise, 104-146, 163-183; for the caisses d'amortissement, 
see Marion, Histoire Financiere, I, 338-385. 
29 The Seven Years' War (1756-1763) caused massive damage to the Crown's finances 
(James C. Riley, The Seven Years' War and the Old Regime: The Economic and Financial Toll 
(Princeton, 1986]). The limited conflict of the American Revolutionary War increased the 
outstanding debt by more than 33%. 
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War increased the demand for loanable funds severely. After 
three decades of peace, in which Estates bond issues averaged 
223,000 livres per year, bond issues jumped to 640,000 per year 
in the 1690s and l,200,000 in the 1700s. The Estates were not 
alone in their vigorous borrowing. The Crown itself was also 
borrowing significantly in the last two decades of the seventeenth 
century. Meanwhile, as the economy slackened as a result of 
incessant warfare, the competition for loanable funds must have 
escalated. The push and pull of these different factors forced the 
market to disperse ·somewhat, but the Estates faced significant 
constraints in finding a new clientele when demand for credit rose 
so sharply. First, as noted earlier, they were required to commit 
future tax revenues, which were expected to be low during 
wartime. Second, the Crown did not allow the Estates to raise 
interest rates high enough to attract lenders. Although war exac-
erbated the demand for funds after 1690, this increased demand 
during the last decades of Louis XIV's reign produced only a 
limited expansion among the subscribers to the Estates' debt. 
More generally, our data does not show any significant dif-
ferences between periods of war, or near default, and periods of 
peace, save for the magnitude of the loan issues by the Estates. 
Comparing the wars at the end of Louis XIV's reign and the 
period from 1756 to 1770, which encompasses the Seven Years' 
War and its aftermath, we failed to detect any significant variation 
in the composition of bondholders. The broadening of the mar-
ket, which increased the presence of Parisians and groups other 
than corporate officers, was gradual, and it was not affected by 
periods of war or peace. Thus, wars were not sources of institu-
tional innovation; nor did they lead individuals to shy away from 
Burgundian debt issues. The fiscal exigencies of war did not 
significantly affect whatever distinguished Burgundian debt from 
other types of debt. 30 
Politics and Bondholders What made the Burgundian bonds 
so desirable? Estates' bonds were safer investments than royal 
rentes. For them to remain so, the Estates had to have sufficient 
future revenues for the payment of interest and the reimbursement 
of bonds, which, in turn, depended on the Crown's good graces, 
because it had the might, if not the legal ability, to force a default. 
30 Short-term bonds were suspended in 1759 and again in 1766. A massive restructuring 
of the king's debts was enacted during the years 1766--r.770. 
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Therefore, the next question is, Why did the Crown allow the 
Estates to pursue a policy of regular repayments? 
As noted earlier, three distinct relationships between the 
Crown, the Estates, and creditors might have discouraged the 
Crown from defaulting. First, the personal relationships between 
the monarch and individual bondholders might have mattered-in 
a way parallel to the political alliances integral to Beik's model. If 
the Estates borrowed primarily from individuals who had personal 
links to the Crown and provided valuable services to the state, 
the king might have been inclined to default on other loans or 
to confiscate the revenues belonging to other groups rather than 
those of the Estates. The presence among the bondholders of 
many servitors of the Princes of Conde, governors of Burgundy, 
and close relatives of the king, suggests just how such personal 
relationships might have worked. In this scenario, the Estates as 
a distinct political corporation, would have played a limited role 
in guaranteeing safety; the borrowers' personal links with the 
Crown would have ensured that the loans were repaid. The 
Estates would have been simply a pass-through, akin to the local 
authorities that paid the juros bonds in Spain. 
A second arrangement at work under the Old Regime was 
the corporate system, as described by Bien. The deputies to the 
Estates of Burgundy had no financial attachment to the institution. 
If the Estates proved unable to pay their debts, the deputies would 
not have suffered any direct personal loss. Moreover, because they 
had little legislative authority, they were powerless to stop the 
Crown from defaulting. Nevertheless, there were regional groups 
with greater political importance: the officer corps of Burgundy, 
and, especially, the members of the Chamber of Accounts and the 
Parlement. As a whole, they rendered valuable services to the 
Crown-services that could be withdrawn if they suffered from 
defaults. Thus, if corporate organization were important in mak-
ing Burgundian bonds safer than royal ones, we would expect the 
officer corps to have held a significant fraction of the bonds and 
to have had good reasons for preserving the integrity of the Estates' 
financial activities. In this case, as in the first scenario, the matter 
of who held the bonds was critical in reducing the likelihood of 
default. 
Though it would be tempting to stress the distinction be-
tween personal links and corporate mechanisms, such a distinction 
must remain mostly theoretical. Indeed, in Beik's account of 
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Languedoc, Louis XIV sought to create personal links both with 
the aristocracy and with corporate leaders. Finding, as we have, 
that corporate officers dominated before l 720 is consistent with 
the argument that the identity of bondholders in that period had 
much to do with reducing royal intervention in debt manage-
ment. Whether or not corporate officers used their organization 
to pressure or cajole the king into leaving the Burgundian debt 
administration free of intervention, however, is not possible for 
us to decide. As a final note on this point, the expansion of the 
Estates' borrowing coincided with a period of declining authority 
for the Conde family. Thus fails the most appealing mechanism 
whereby personal links might have allowed for the continued 
safety of Burgundian bonds. 31 
In any event, the argument that the identity of bondholders 
played a role in maintaining the good management of the Bur-
gundian debt after 1720 is untenable. The social identities and 
political affiliations of the Estates' bondholders were too diverse 
to put much pressure on the Crown. A third party, or parties, 
who derived benefits in other spheres of activity must have con-
strained the Crown to respect the Estates' obligations. That group 
would have stood to benefit most from the continuance of the 
Estates as a significant financial intermediary, regardless of whether 
its members held much of the Estates' debts. Again, the officer 
corps may have played this role, but not simply as bondholders 
protecting their investments; the Estates' financial role enhanced 
the province's independence and thereby the authority of all the 
officers. The elus of the Estates, who were comprised of a small 
rotating group from each of the three orders, were another pos-
sibility. As their positions became more visible and important with 
the Estates' activities, they surely would have had the motivation 
to resist any royal default plans. Yet, in the decades following 
1660, the elus alone were unlikely to have been in a strong 
political position. After all, the Fronde had ushered in the aboli-
tion of the Estates of Provence, and those of Normandy met for 
the last time a few years later. Political forces beyond the elus 
must have played an important role in reducing default risk. 
The three mechanisms for constraining the Crown outlined 
above were probably working jointly but at varying intensities at 
31 See Ligou, "Elus Generaux," rr1-rr2. 
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different times. Examination of the Estates' creditors in the l7IOs 
reveals not only individuals with personal links to the monarch 
(for example, the Duke of Noailles), but also provincial officers 
(for example, presidents of the Dijon Parlement), as well as a 
plethora of lenders whose hold on the Crown can only be de-
scribed as tenuous. Changes over time largely affected the degree 
to which each of the different mechanisms discouraged the Crown 
from confiscating the revenues earmarked for debt repayment. 
The evolution of the characteristics of bondholders favors the 
view that the political independence of the Estates was limited in 
the seventeenth century but that it grew significantly in the 
eighteenth. After l 7 IO, individuals of limited wealth-risk averse 
because they were unable to hold portfolios of diverse invest-
ments-increased their lending to the Estates. That the new 
creditors were of limited political power suggests that the Estates 
were able to offer them low-risk bonds. Hence, the Estates' ability 
to make their bonds safe would seem to have grown in the 
eighteenth century. Although they never achieved the powers of 
the British Parliament, the Estates did go a significant way in that 
direction-a direction not exactly consistent with the tenets of 
absolutism. Indeed, the Crown appears to have been more con-
strained in its dealing with the Estates after 1720 than before. The 
new restrictions eventually increased the ability of the Estates to 
borrow for the Crown. In the early period, the limited authority 
of the Estates prevented them from expanding their lender clien-
tele beyond the rich and politically powerful. Later, however, the 
increased financial independence of the Estates allowed them to 
intermediate more debt. 
Some scholars view absolutism as responsible for making 
regimes increasingly inefficient because of an institutional ossifica-
tion that progressively limits both the scope for reform and the 
Crown's freedom of action. The evidence from Burgundy suggests 
that we temper these notions; the French system was able to 
evolve in a way that provided more, rather than fewer, resources 
to the Crown. 
In general, the expansion of Burgundian financial act1v1ty 
following Louis XIV's reign was both finite and based on a 
political compromise that did not exist before l 7 l 3. That the 
expansion was finite is clear from two observations: First, the 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 22:24:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
6IO I MARK POTTER AND JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL 
Crown did not bring back the Estates of other provinces that it 
had removed in the seventeenth century; nor did it create new 
ones. Evidently, the Crown saw Estates either directly or indirectly 
as political constraints. Thus, the ability of the Estates of Burgundy 
to raise funds easily came at a political cost-reduced royal power. 
The second observation follows from the first. The Estates of all 
the provinces together raised a limited amount of the royal loans; 
their debts were approximately 16 percent of the Old Regime's 
total in 1792. The Estates had limited power relative to the 
Crown, and, as their debts rose, the king's return to defaulting on 
their bonds was bound to increase beyond the political costs of 
any such default. Hence, without a fundamental redistribution of 
power away from the Crown, the Estates could not possibly have 
achieved the financial standing of the British Parliament. 32 
Yet, political change did occur, at least c. 1720. In Burgundy, 
the Estates were able to tum from a clientele of local officers 
concentrated in the Parlement and the Chamber of Accounts to 
an increasingly diverse set of individuals dispersed throughout 
France, from both sexes and all social categories. This diversifica-
tion occurred without any change in the Estates' financial policies. 
Thus, some of the political constraints on the expansion of finan-
cial markets must have eased. With demonstrable success, the 
Estates were able to guard against royal default without limiting 
subscribers to the local elite. Most important, investors recognized 
the relative security of the Estates' loans, as the participation of 
artisans, bourgeois, merchants, professionals, and others with little 
direct political clout demonstrates. 33 
The Estates of Burgundy were but one of a number of similar 
institutions. Those of Languedoc were more active financially and 
those of Brittany just as active. Throughout the years from 1660 
to 1789, the Crown relied simultaneously on the sale of venal 
offices, corporations, financiers, and the bond market to raise 
32 Interpreting the regional assemblies in the Crown's reform proposal of1787 as an attempt 
to create Estates is somewhat of a reach, since their original purpose was simply to allocate 
tax burdens (Jean Egret. The French Prerevolution 1787-1789 [Chicago, 1977]). 
A more appropriate way to measure the Estates' debts would be to compare all capital 
raised during the period 1750-1789, but such estimates will have to wait until further archival 
research has been completed. 
33 For a similar view about political change, see Kathryn Norberg, "The French Fiscal 
Crisis of 1788 and the Financial Origins of The Revolution of 1789," in Hoffinan and idem 
(eds.), Fiscal Crisis, Liberty, and Representative Government 1450-1789 (Stanford, 1994), 280-282. 
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funds, but the crisis that followed the death of Louis XIV inaugu-
rated a transition away from financiers and venality toward the 
bond market and Estates. Such a transition cautions against view-
ing absolutism as prematurely ossified and incapable of political 
evolution. Furthermore, as we have demonstrated, royal financial 
practices must be placed in precise historical contexts, because the 
political relationships between the king and the elites were con-
stantly evolving. The mechanism of personal rule that Beik high-
lighted, in which the king took the lead in reaching an 
accommodation with elites, probably worked best in periods of 
peace and prosperity; when war resumed in 1689, new links had 
to be forged. Venality, however, was so costly to the administra-
tive system that after 1713 it was no longer used as a significant 
device for raising capital. 
Our evidence suggests that a dialectical relationship existed 
between the Crown and the elites of Old Regime France. The 
Crown met international challenges and financial exigencies either 
by accommodating or undermining. Elites responded accordingly, 
protecting their interests as well as possible while benefiting as 
they were able from their privileged positions. Their actions, in 
turn, affected the choices available to the Crown. These financial 
and political relationships between the Crown and the various 
elites of the kingdom-often mutually beneficial, at times antago-
nistic, always in flux-are central to an understanding of absolut-
ism as a political system. 
Appendix: Social Classification 
Because individuals offered a wealth of information about their 
social and occupational identities under the Old Regime, creating social 
classifications might seem to be an easy task. Unfortunately, the infor-
mation was often ambiguous, not lending itself to neat categories-for 
example, notaries who are also avocats au parlement (lawyers) and ecuyers 
(squires). Thus, notaries fit into three potential categories: royal office-
holders, professionals, and nobles. 
We adopted a simple scheme that both preserves the entirety of the 
information offered by the records and provides a classification appro-
priate for our research. We coded complete occupational definitions, 
and then classified individuals according to the scheme below. In the 
case of conflict we gave precedence to officeholding, classifying indi-
viduals in that category independent of their social status or other 
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occupation. Although we can identify nearly mo social categories, we 
present only the broad ones here: men unidentified, royal officers 
general (administrative, foreign affairs, other), financial officers, judicial 
officers, estate and town officers, military (all branches of the armed 
forces and the gendarmes), nobles, domestics (servants and officers of 
nobles), farmers (plowmen, gardeners, vintners), trade (merchants, 
burghers, bakers, butchers, innkeepers, etc.), artisans (craftsmen and 
construction workers), clergy (male and female, secular and regular), 
professionals (lawyers, professors, doctors, etc.), institutions (hospitals, 
charities, schools, convents, monasteries, chapter houses, etc.), and 
women not otherwise identified. 
In the analysis, domestics, farmers, trade, artisans, and professionals 
were considered, as a unit, the third estate. There were only thirty-eight 
farmers; hence, the bulk of the private-sector category involves city 
dwellers. 
